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Abstract. Many theorists understand human rights as only aiming to secure a minimally 
decent existence, rather than a positively good or flourishing life. Some of the theoretical 
considerations that support this minimalist view have been mapped out in the philo-
sophical literature. The aim of this paper is to explain how a relatively neglected theo-
retical desideratum – namely, determinacy – can be invoked in arguing for human rights 
minimalism. Most of us want a theory of human rights whose demands can be realized, 
and which is acceptable to a range of worldviews. But we might also expect our theory 
to provide determinate answers to questions of scope (i.e. which putative rights are bona 
fide human rights?) and practical implementation (i.e. what concrete duties are gener-
ated by which rights?). A minimalist view of human rights makes it is easier to jointly 
fulfil all of these desiderata. 
 
1. Introduction 
According to a widely-shared view human rights encompass a very limited range 
of ethical concerns: not all human interests, only urgent interests;1 not our pref-
erences, only our needs;2 not all wrongs, only severe injustices;3 not a good life in 
                                               
1 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 110. 
2 See David Miller, “Grounding human rights” (2012) 15:4 Critical Review of International Social and Po-
litical Philosophy 407. 
3 James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Blackwell, 2007) at 36-37; Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsist-





the fullest sense, but only a minimally decent or autonomous life.4 In short, hu-
man rights are not about realizing the best, they’re about shielding us from the 
worst. I will call this general theoretical stance Minimalism. 
Although Minimalism is often endorsed in philosophical debates around human 
rights, contemporary human rights law and human rights practice do not seem 
very Minimalistic. Granted, special priority is sometimes given to a small set of 
‘minimum core’ human rights obligations, demanding provision of things like 
food, healthcare, housing, and education. But these minimum core obligations are 
only one facet of human rights practice.5 When we look at the scope of the prac-
tice as a whole, today, what we find seems to extend well beyond a Minimalist 
scope. As Charles Beitz says, human rights today “are not very much more mini-
mal than [the rights] proposed in many contemporary theories of social justice”.6 
For instance, some of the human rights currently recognized by international in-
stitutions include the right to the highest attainable standard of health,7 the right 
to free higher education,8 the right to secure internet access,9 and the right of chil-
dren to grow up in a happy family environment.10 From a Minimalist perspective 
this looks like a serious case of ‘mission creep.’11 We know that a person’s well-
being is negatively affected if she can’t access the internet, or if she grows up in 
an unhappy family, but we don’t necessarily view these hardships as severe injus-
tices. And we don’t think that people who have to pay for university, or who re-
ceive health services from non-state-of-the-art hospitals, ipso facto fail to have 
minimally decent lives.  
The question I am interested in here is why do (many) theorists continue to nom-
inally endorse a Minimalistic understanding of what human rights are, or should 
be, when the practice has so clearly extended beyond a minimalistic scope? Why 
                                               
4 Nickel, supra note 3 at 36; James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 53; Michael 
Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 2001) at 56-57. 
5 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations, 14 December 1990. 
6 Charles Beitz, “What human rights mean” (2013) 132:1 Daedalus 132/1 36 at 39. 
7 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 12.1. 
8 ICESCR, Article 13.2 (c). 
9 In 2016 the UN Human Rights Council issued a non-binding resolution condemning government dis-
ruption of internet access, which was reported in the media as an informal declaration of ‘the right to 
internet access’; see General Assembly resolution 32/L.20, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human 
Rights on the Internet, A/HRC/32/L.20 (27 June 2016), available from ap.ohchr.org/documents/all-
docs.aspx?doc_id=20280. 
10 See Preamble of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
11 i.e. “the gradual addition of new tasks or activities to a project so that the original purpose or idea begins 





not join with theorists like Beitz – and countless human rights advocates and ac-
tivists – who welcome an expanded idea of what human rights are, one that en-
compasses various interests that are less-than-urgent, and injustices that are not 
quite so severe? 
The recent philosophical literature offers an answer to this question that is plau-
sible as far as it goes, but incomplete. Minimalism is an attractive way of theoriz-
ing human rights, so the argument goes, because we want the realization of hu-
man rights standards to be feasible and pluralistically adequate (i.e. acceptable to 
a wide range of worldviews), and these desiderata seem more realizable given a 
Minimalist understanding of human rights. This diagnosis leaves out an im-
portant piece of the explanatory puzzle. An ideal of determinacy is also part of what 
makes Minimalism an attractive way of theorizing human rights. It would be 
preferable if we had a more stable consensus about which putative rights are bona 
fide human rights, and it would be better if human rights claims could be cashed 
out into relatively specific and unambiguous practical requirements. In what fol-
lows I discuss some of the reasons why it is easier to realize these desiderata given 
Minimalism, and I thereby show how the ideal of determinacy supports a Mini-
malistic understanding of human rights. More subtly, I want to explain how the 
various desiderata that are in play here – determinacy, pluralistic adequacy, and 
feasibility – interact and reinforce each other. The theoretical pull towards Min-
imalism is about wanting to formulate a schedule of human rights that is simul-
taneously determinate, pluralistically adequate, and feasible. 
In §2 I say more about what Minimalism is, and about how the ideals of feasibility 
and pluralistic adequacy lend support to it. In §3 I explain how the ideal of deter-
minacy complements these other desiderata and bolsters the case for Minimal-
ism. In §4 I discuss the ways in which one might resist a Minimalistic view of 
human rights, notwithstanding the arguments for Minimalism that appeal to de-
terminacy and other theoretical desiderata. 
 
2. Clarifying Minimalism 
 
2.1 An institutional approach to human rights  
Contemporary philosophical work on human rights often focuses on a methodo-
logical debate, about whether and how a theory of human rights should be in-
formed by an understanding of human rights institutions and practices. Some au-
thors favor a Political Conception of human rights. Roughly, they hold that in order 
to explain what human rights are, we have to start by understanding the ‘work’ 





activism.12 Other authors favor a Naturalistic Conception of human rights. 
Roughly, they believe we can develop an account of what human rights are with-
out affording interpretative primacy to human rights institutions and practices.13 
While I don’t believe that these methodological alternatives have to be thought 
of as irreconcilable opponents,14 my discussion will be broadly located within the 
first of these two camps. I am primarily interested in how we best theorize the 
present-day global political institution of human rights. For my purposes here, 
then, Minimalism is the view that the proper practical-cum-political role for hu-
man rights to fulfil, in the law and other social practices, is not about specifying 
a complete template for social justice or human flourishing, but rather, specifying 
some sort of basic schedule of minimal protections and provisions that all people 
should receive.  
Consequently, the arguments for Minimalism that I am discussing here will not 
necessarily have much purchase on those who favor a purely Naturalistic Con-
ception of human rights. For example, suppose that like John Finnis you think 
human rights should be understood as the minimal requirements of morality 
which can be derived from principles of practical reason.15 This programmatic 
way of conceptualizing human rights could easily lead to something Minimalist 
in character, because you could easily end up concluding that only a very limited 
schedule of moral requirements can be derived from principles of practical reason. 
Whatever way that inquiry plays out, my point is that this would be an entirely 
different type of theoretical argument for Minimalism compared to the ones that 
I am discussing. The arguments for Minimalism presented below are all ulti-
mately derived from thinking about the practical functions that we want human 
rights to fulfil. If you see these practicalities as only coming into play after we have 
figured out what human rights essentially are, then my arguments will only seem 
relevant to the question of how we act to try to protect or realize human rights. 
                                               
12 Influential theories of human rights underpinned by the Political Conception include those developed 
by John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999), Joseph Raz, “Human rights without 
foundations” in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010) 321, and Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights.  
13 For a brief overview see Section 2 of James W. Nickel, “Human rights”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2019) (plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/rights-human/). To be clear, the Naturalistic Con-
ception needn’t promise to deliver a completely abstract, a priori theory of what human rights are. Some 
who favor this approach think that practical considerations have a secondary role to play in informing 
our understanding of what human rights are, e.g. Griffin’s view that human rights are about protecting 
people’s capacity for agency but in a way that is broadly practicable under existing conditions. 
14 Adam Etinson & S. Matthew Liao, “Political and naturalistic conceptions of human rights: a false po-
lemic?” (2012) 9:1 The Journal of Moral Philosophy 327 at 334-36. 





2.2 In what sense does Minimalism ‘demand less’? 
According to Samuel Moyn human rights became a popular ideal in the 1970s 
partly because of their modest ambitions. People were disillusioned with grand 
ideals and ideologies, and a human rights framework seemed like an appealing 
alternative because it eschewed all this, instead focusing on atrocity-prevention 
and “minimal constraints on reasonable politics”.16 Whether the public was right 
to take this view is a further question. The scope of international human rights 
law was already expanding by the 1970s, and it was in various ways more ambi-
tious – a vision slightly closer to another grand ideal – than its newly enthusiastic 
supporters recognized. In any case, Minimalists can be thought of as those who 
think that human rights should stick to the sort of modest ambitions which, on 
Moyn’s account, made them an appealing approach to thinking about justice, 
compared to the ideologies that they superseded. 
But in what sense, exactly, does a Minimalist view of human rights impose de-
mands that are more modest than they might otherwise be? At the very least Min-
imalism sees the scope of human rights as narrower than the scope of justice or 
morality per se. This isn’t yet saying much, however, because one can endorse this 
scope-related thesis without being a Minimalist. Those who think it is appropri-
ate for human rights treaties to extend beyond Minimalist constraints don’t be-
lieve that every moral issue is about human rights. Most of us think it is wrong to 
say hurtful things about our friends behind their backs, but no-one believes that 
such behavior violates a human right. In short, seeing the scope of human rights 
as narrower than that of justice or morality per se doesn’t yet make you a Minimal-
ist. Minimalism must also be distinguished from the idea that there is only a small 
number of bona fide human rights claims, i.e. what James Nickel calls Ultraminimal-
ism.17 The notion that human rights should only pertain to urgent needs or injus-
tices doesn’t automatically entail that we will end up with a short list when we 
are enumerating the rights that fit this characterization. 
So what is the distinctive way in which Minimalism limits the scope of human 
rights? It is best understood as a thesis about what human rights are not. 
Roughly, it is the view that they are not standards whose realization ensures 
rights-bearers an entirely good or flourishing life. We can rank different stand-
                                               
16 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010).  
17 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights at 98-103. See Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, for another 
description of Ultraminimalism. It is unclear exactly how few rights one would have to posit in order to 
qualify as an Ultraminimalist. We could say that a list of human rights is Ultraminimal if – like Rawls’s 
list, in The Law of Peoples at 65 – it has fewer entries than the articles of the UDHR. But this seems arbitrary, 
in a way that any comparative numerical criterion is bound to replicate. Nevertheless, it does seem like a 
noteworthy feature of some theories of human rights, including Rawls’s, that instead of programmatically 
generating an open-ended list of rights claims, they insist upon a small (and non-open-ended) number of 
rights claims. In any case, my point here is simply that a Minimalistic account of human rights won’t 





ards of human life along an evaluative spectrum, from the low mark of ‘barely tol-
erable’, to a mid-level characterization like ‘decent’, or better yet, ‘good’, and then 
to the upper extreme of ‘excellent’ or ‘flourishing’. One way of conceptualizing 
human rights is as entitlements to conditions and resources that enable people to 
realize a certain standard of life, up to some nominated point along this evaluative 
spectrum. Given this way of framing things, Minimalism can be defined as the 
view that human rights enable the realization of a standard that is less than a good 
life. For Minimalists, human rights have their sights set lower, and merely aim to 
facilitate a decent existence.18 
Granted, these are vague terms. But there is no obvious way around that, initially. 
Different Minimalistic theories will cash out these ideas in different ways, and a 
general definition needs to accommodate this. The philosophical literature at-
tests to this diversity. For example, some Minimalists understand human rights 
as not aiming to secure a good life, but rather only a decent or minimally good 
life,19 or only the fundamental conditions of a good life,20 or of any life at all.21 Ra-
ther than a flourishing life, human rights, for some Minimalists, only aim to guar-
antee “the more austere life of a normative agent”.22 Others say that human rights 
only secure needs, rather than preferences.23 And for theorists who favor a status-
                                               
18 I am glossing over some complex questions about what it means for human rights to ‘realize’, ‘ensure’, 
or ‘facilitate’ a given standard of life. I have described Minimalism as the view that the realization of hu-
man rights standards doesn’t ensure people a good or flourishing life, but merely aims to facilitate a decent 
life. But these terms do not precisely capture the complexity of the relation in question. If we say that 
human rights are supposed to facilitate a decent life, this may suggest, misleadingly, that the general up-
holding of human rights in fact is sufficient for everyone attaining a decent life. But people can have flour-
ishing lives while experiencing human rights violations, and people whose human rights are upheld can 
have an abject existence. Respect for a person’s human rights is thus neither necessary nor sufficient for 
that person attaining whatever positive state of existence human rights are supposed to enable; see Ro-
wan Cruft, “From a good life to human rights: some complications” in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & 
Massimo Renzo, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 101. Matthew 
Liao tries to offer a more nuanced specification of the relation in question. Liao says human rights protect 
an adequate range of the fundamental conditions needed to pursue the basic activities that are essential 
to human beings qua human beings; see S. Matthew Liao, “Human rights as fundamental conditions for a 
good life” in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 79. According to Cruft, Liao’s specification of the relation implies 
a controversial form of value pluralism. But my arguments ultimately do not hinge on the resolution of 
this issue, because what defines Minimalism is its claim about which standard of life human rights are sup-
posed to enable, not a claim about the nature of the relation between human rights and the standard of life 
they’re supposed to enable. Whatever the best specification of the relevant relation is – exactly how hu-
man rights enable a given standard of life – we can use it to differentiate Minimalism from non-Minimalist 
approaches. 
19 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights at 36-37. 
20 S. Matthew Liao, The Right to Be Loved (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 39-73.  
21 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry at 56. 
22 Griffin, On Human Rights at 53. 





based – as opposed to interest-based – account of rights, Minimalism will under-
stand human rights as requiring only some basic form of recognition – like, say, 
recognition of a person’s status as a rational agent,24 or a political subject25 – ra-
ther than a more full-blooded form of recognition, e.g. of a person’s complexly-
situated cultural identity. 
As well as encompassing this range of Minimalist ideas about the limited scope 
of human rights, my characterization of Minimalism also accords with various 
positive theses that are espoused about the nature of human rights. In particular, 
consider familiar claims about the urgency of human rights. Most authors want 
to reserve human rights terminology for especially weighty normative concerns.26 
This seems like either another way of expressing the negative characterization of 
Minimalism that I have offered, or else an immediate upshot of that characteriza-
tion. If human rights only provide the bare necessities needed to make human 
lives tolerable, then their scope will naturally be confined to urgent human inter-
ests. Relatedly, human rights are sometimes characterized as a source of high-
priority obligations, in that they should ordinarily take precedence if they conflict 
with other kinds of norms, e.g. those related to procedural justice, or to promot-
ing utility or economic prosperity.27 Minimalism naturally fits with this under-
standing. If the aim of human rights is to give us the essentials required for a min-
imally decent life, it follows that they will generate high-priority demands, since 
their realization will be necessary to alleviate conditions that otherwise make 
people’s lives intolerable. 
 
2.3 The attractions of Minimalism 
To summarize, Minimalism says that human rights seek to enable a merely decent 
or tolerable human existence. This definition is compatible with a variety of dif-
ferent ways of spelling out what a minimally decent or tolerable human existence 
consists in. And it coheres with the view that human rights are of their nature a 
source of particularly urgent or high priority duties. 
                                               
24 George Kateb, Human Dignity (Harvard University Press, 2011) at 17; Katrin Flikschuh, “Human rights 
in a Kantian mode: a sketch” in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo, eds, Philosophical Foun-
dations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 653. 
25 Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about human rights: the most we can hope for?” (2004) 12:2 Journal of 
Political Philosophy 190 at 192. 
26 For instance, Nickel favors Minimalism because it ensures that human rights are concerned only with 
“very severe problems”; see Making Sense of Human Rights at 56. Griffin focuses on the Minimalist value of 
personhood partly because of its “special importance”; see On Human Rights at 36. Miller focuses on things 
that are “an essential element in human life”, and thus he favors a Minimalist, needs-oriented account of 
human rights; see “Grounding human rights” at 412. 





Moyn says people were attracted to the modest aspirations of human rights, com-
pared to other political moralities. But why should this modesty be attractive? 
One prima facie advantage of a Minimalist approach is feasibility. Utterly infeasible 
human rights claims can seem like pie-in-the-sky aspirations. If we are Minimal-
ists then human rights are less likely to face this problem. The less extensive the 
demands of human rights, the easier it is to fulfil them.28 Granted, there are some 
complications in saying that a given demand is infeasible or unfulfillable. De-
mands that cannot be fulfilled under existing political conditions may be fulfilled 
under altered conditions, and if there is some possibility of acting to realize those 
new conditions, then it is misleading to insistently characterize the initial de-
mands as infeasible.29 But it is consistent with recognizing this complication to 
think that credible comparative assessments of feasibility are both possible, and 
relevant in assessing the merits of a normative framework. Other things being 
equal, it is more feasible to fulfil the demands of a framework that only purports 
to satisfy people’s most basic needs, than it is to fulfil the demands of a more eth-
ically ambitious framework. 
One aspect of feasibility to emphasize is political feasibility. Human rights agree-
ments typically call for some form of domestic implementation, and the legislative 
and institutional reforms that are involved in this are often a source of political 
conflict. We have reason to think that such reforms will be more politically 
achievable, though, if we have a schedule of human rights that is (i) narrower in 
focus, allowing for more discretion in policy implementation, (ii) non-partisan, 
in that it doesn’t systematically recommend one major party-political platform 
over others, and (iii) limited in its implementation costs, such that it doesn’t risk 
overwhelming the state’s economic resources.30 All this suggests another prima 
facie advantage for a Minimalist account of human rights. By making more modest 
demands, a Minimalist account seems more politically feasible in each of these 
ways. And there is a close connection here to the idea that human rights should 
be pluralistically adequate, i.e. acceptable to a wide variety of different worldviews. 
In principle, it seems that it will be easier for a wider range of values and belief-
systems to generate support for human rights, to the extent that human rights are 
construed Minimalistically.31 
                                               
28 Maurice Cranston, “Are there any human rights?” (1983) 112:4 Daedalus 1 at 13. 
29 For further discussion of these complexities see Pablo Gilabert, “The feasibility of basic socioeconomic 
rights: a conceptual exploration” (2009) 59:237 Philosophical Quarterly 659 at 664-68. 
30 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights at 36-37. 
31 We should distinguish the type of Minimalism that I am discussing – what Joshua Cohen calls Substan-
tive Minimalism – from a related but different view, which Cohen calls Justificatory Minimalism. Whereas 
the former sets limits on the content of human rights claims, Justificatory Minimalism sets limits upon 
how we justify those claims. It says theories of human rights should provide us with “a conception of 
human rights without… connecting that conception to a particular ethical or religious outlook”; the Jus-





These kinds of reasons to favor Minimalism have received some analysis in the 
recent philosophical literature.32 It is open to debate as to whether a decisive case 
for Minimalism can be made on these grounds, but there is at least a prima facie 
compelling rationale for Minimalism available here. On a Minimalist approach, 
human rights have a more modest ambition than other comprehensive political 
doctrines, like Marxism, Perfectionistic versions of Liberalism, or conservative 
political moralities centered on religious or national identities. Comprehensive 
political doctrines offer a holistic picture of a good human life and a just social 
order. If a human rights framework can resist the urge to follow suit, and instead 
confine itself to identifying people’s most urgent needs, and demanding their ful-
filment, it will, in comparison, be subject to less moral and political contestation, 
and more realizable as a result. 
 
2.4 Further complications 
One complication, in trying to clarify how Minimalism relates to other theoretical 
positions on human rights, relates to the distinction between positive and nega-
tive rights. The idea that human rights should not include positive rights, like a 
right to food or housing, has sometimes been portrayed as an element or an up-
shot of Minimalism. For some, to be a Minimalist, is to believe that all bona fide 
human rights are negative rights.33 But this isn’t the right way or best way to con-
strue Minimalism. Minimalism says that human rights aim to facilitate a decent 
or tolerable human existence, and in many contexts this necessitates the provi-
sion of subsistence goods. Consider Henry Shue’s discussion of the ‘basic rights’ 
necessary for the enjoyment of other rights. A right to physical security is basic, 
in Shue’s sense, since its violation jeopardizes the individual’s ability to enjoy her 
                                               
rights with the aim of presenting a conception that is capable of winning broader public allegiance”; see 
“Minimalism about human rights” at 192. A number of theorists see Justificatory Minimalism as integral 
to the idea of human rights; besides Cohen, see also Rawls, The Law of Peoples at 121-22. (But for an opposing 
view, see Etinson and Liao, “Political and naturalistic conceptions of human rights” at 334-36.) There is 
also evidence that key human rights texts, like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
aspired to Justificatory Minimalism. Jacques Maritain famously reported that drafters of the UDHR were 
able to agree on the rights only “on the condition no one asks us why”; see Human Rights: Comments and 
Interpretations (Wingate, 1949) at 9. The merits of Substantive Minimalism that relate to its focus on the 
morally uncontroversial are separable from whatever considerations may be invoked to argue for Justifi-
catory Minimalism. 
32 For example, see Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry at 56-57; Chapter 6 of Beitz, The Idea of 
Human Rights, Rawls, The Law of Peoples at 65; Chapter 5 of Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human 
Development Approach (Harvard University Press, 2011); John Tasioulas, “From Utopia to Kazanistan: John 
Rawls and The Law of Peoples” (2002) 22:2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 367 at 390-95. 
33 E.g. see Cranston, “Are there any human rights?”; Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Shue is 
one author who questions the plausibility of distinguishing liberty and welfare rights by virtue of their 
positive or negative character. As he says, representative cases of both types of rights generate both pos-
itive and negative duties; see Shue, Basic Rights at 19. Still, the distinction that is conventionally marked 
by these terms is helpful way of referring to two broad classes of rights we sometimes want to differenti-
ate. My point here is that however we may try to formally distinguish those classes, it won’t be the case 





other rights. But by the same logic subsistence rights must be basic. After all, a 
starving person cannot enjoy her right to free speech or free assembly. Thus, for 
Shue, basic rights include rights to things like food and housing, alongside rights 
of non-interference.34 Similar lines of reasoning appear in the theories of human 
rights offered by James Griffin, Martha Nussbaum, and Matthew Liao.35 The 
strongest version of Minimalism will recognize both negative civil and political 
rights and various positive economic and social rights as bona fide human rights. A 
minimally decent existence requires that certain basic subsistence needs will be 
secured as a matter of right. 
Another complication relates to the idea of human rights as a specification of the 
moral minimum. On Shue’s definition, the moral minimum is “the least that each 
individual can demand” of other actors – people, governments, corporations, the 
international community – or the least that these actors must be made to do.36 It 
would be easy to think of Minimalism as being committed to the idea that the 
scope of human rights is coextensive with a complete specification of this moral 
minimum. But we should tread carefully here. In conditions of extreme scarcity 
it may simply be impossible to ensure that everyone has what they need to enjoy 
a minimally decent existence. In those conditions, to insist that governments, cor-
porations, or the international community must fulfil people’s (Minimalistically-
construed) human rights is to demand more of these actors than they can possibly 
achieve. Minimalism is defined by what people need in order to have a decent or 
tolerable life. There is only a contingent relation between this and what we can 
properly demand of others.37 
                                               
34 Shue, Basic Rights at 19. 
35 Griffin’s agency-based account says that human rights shouldn’t only generate bare guarantees of non-
interference in the exercise of one’s agency. Rather, Griffin says, they should also guarantee basic re-
sources like food, education, and healthcare that are necessary for the actual realization of people’s 
agency; see On Human Rights at 33. Nussbaum characterizes human rights as the essential requirements for 
pursuing ‘central human capabilities’ – i.e. activities central to human life itself, like reasoning, affiliating 
with others, and engaging in some forms of recreation – and she says that the realization of these capa-
bilities requires both negative rights of non-interference as well as positive forms of resource-provision; 
see “Human rights and capabilities” (1997) 66:1 Fordham Law Review 273 at 287-88. Liao’s theory stresses 
the provision of the freedoms and resources necessary to pursue the basic activities which are fundamental 
to any good life – but not those needed in order to enjoy an excellent life; see The Right to be Loved at 41-46. 
36 Shue, Basic Rights at xi. 
37 On Michael Walzer’s alternative formulation, the moral minimum is a set of demands that all or nearly 
all cultures accept, despite their cultural differences; see Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) at 9-10. One may argue that Minimalism is committed to the 
moral minimum in this sense. It is a condition of something being a human right that it is a right whose 
demands are accepted by nearly all cultures. But this also seems like it would be mistaking a contingent 
relation for a necessary one. We are more likely to find consensus across cultures about the demands of a 
minimally decent life, than about the nature of a good or flourishing life. But even if there are some de-
mands accepted by nearly all cultures, there is no a priori guarantee that they will include the provision of 





3. Arguments from Determinacy 
Let’s turn to the question of how one may appeal to the ideal of determinacy in 
order to argue for a Minimalist approach to human rights. I will begin by consid-
ering how indeterminacy can be a problem in human rights theory and practice. 
As I will discuss below, human rights theorists are sometimes accused of pro-
claiming rights in a careless fashion, without sufficient attention to the details of 
what these rights require of whom. They are also sometimes accused of failing to 
specify criteria against which the legitimacy of their human rights proclamations 
can be judged. These indeterminacies undermine the credibility of human rights 
as a practical or institutional program. The question that I will be exploring in 
what follows, in essence, is whether a Minimalist approach to human rights can 
potentially do something to mitigate these problems. 
 
3.1 Practical indeterminacy 
Let’s start by more carefully pulling apart the two types of indeterminacy noted 
above. One of these is what I will just call practical indeterminacy. To illustrate, con-
sider the right not to be tortured. There is near-universal agreement that this is a 
human right. But this still leaves room for debate about the right’s exact contours. 
What counts as torture? Are there exceptions to the right not to be tortured in 
particular emergencies? For particular offenders? Who bears the duty to enforce 
and monitor compliance with this right? And how should we prioritize this task? 
How should we weigh it against duties relating to education or housing, given 
that they all involve the expenditure of resources? 
At the extreme practical determinacy is a matter of answering all these questions. 
A human rights system would be fully practically determinate if it had answers 
to questions about (i) who holds which rights; (ii) what the content of those 
rights is; (iii) how stringent they are; (iv) what the duties associated with them 
are; (v) who exactly bears those duties; (vi) how those duties are to be prioritized 
relative to the duties generated by other rights claims, and (vii) which exceptions 
or extenuating conditions qualify the duties. There is enough complexity here 
that no human rights system could ever be fully practically determinate. But it is 
a standard that can be more or less realized. 
Why should we regard it as a problem, then, if a human rights system is less prac-
tically determinate than it could otherwise be? One partial answer is that in to-
day’s international political order, human rights are a focal point for political 
agreements. Part of the purpose of any agreement is to underwrite a shared recog-
nition of the attitudes of the parties involved, with respect to the agreement’s 
content. If an agreement is ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate, its parties are 
in danger of perceiving shared intentions or commitments where there are unrec-





way in which human rights theories may helpfully contribute to human rights 
practice, then, is by clarifying the content of past agreements, or by clarifying the 
terms for new ones. Figuring out the practical implications of various rights 
claims isn’t something that a theory itself achieves, but greater theoretical preci-
sion makes the task more manageable.  
Authors like Onora O’Neill and Eric Posner identify a different set of worries 
about practical indeterminacy in human rights. O’Neill argues that human rights 
practitioners often fail to specify who bears the correlative duties for the rights 
that they proclaim, especially when it comes to ‘second-generation’ social and 
economic rights. This undercuts the legitimacy of these rights claims, O’Neill 
says, because rights without identifiable duty-bearers are not genuine rights. This 
failure of specification also undermines the general utility of human rights prac-
tice, O’Neill argues, and it misleads ‘victims’, i.e. people whose unfulfilled needs 
are meant to be protected by these rights.38 
Posner presents a related set of criticisms relating to the practical indeterminacy 
of international human rights law. Given how many rights are asserted in this 
body of law, and that securing compliance, for most of them, requires the alloca-
tion of state funds and resources, it is nearly impossible for states, especially eco-
nomically under-resourced states, to comply with them all. “When many rights 
exist”, Posner says, “a state can justify its failure to respect one right by insisting 
that it has exhausted financial and political resources trying to comply with other 
rights”, and this makes it difficult to enforce human rights standards and to cri-
tique non-compliant actors.39 Among other things, one problem that follows from 
this is sheer waste. Large amounts of capital, human resources, political will, and 
diplomatic endeavor are spent trying to address policy challenges, through a sys-
tem that has a limited capacity to compel member states to comply with its own 
directives and injunctions. The best way forward, according to Posner, is to re-
place the international human rights system with something more modest in its 
aims – an empirically-informed set of best-practice guidelines for addressing ur-
gent human needs and interests, which states are urged to implement but not 
formally bound to. 
O’Neill’s and Posner’s complaints are cogent, but not conclusive. The fact that 
duty-bearers for positive human rights aren’t always identified doesn’t mean that 
they cannot be. O’Neill’s point about the philosophical illegitimacy of second-
generation rights can be answered, then, at least in principle.40 As for practical 
                                               
38 See Onora O’Neill, “The dark side of human rights” (2005) 81:2 International Affairs 427.  
39 Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 137. 
40 Even in circumstances in which no actor can plausibly be nominated as the correlative duty-bearer for 
a particular rights claim, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the rights claim is illegitimate. Granted, it is 
no good postulating that there is a human right to x if we cannot specify any correlative duties for sup-
plying or securing x. But to say that we must specify such duties doesn’t mean that we must also be in a 





consequences, even if the costs of indeterminacy are real and significant, they may 
be counterbalanced by practical benefits that come with avoiding specificity in 
human rights treaties and institutions. For instance, in human rights declarations 
we may try to make things short and simple, and elide some of the complicated 
implementation issues, simply in order to make the documents more legible to a 
wide audience, including laypeople. 
Eliding practical detail may also increase the probability that a given human 
rights proposal will become the object of a political agreement. The right not to 
be tortured is more likely to receive ‘buy-in’ if ‘torture’ is loosely defined. Granted, 
this can partly tarnish the credibility of the agreement, since it isn’t wholly clear 
what shared commitments, if any, the parties are undertaking. But the symbolic 
and diplomatic benefits of entering into such agreements should not be totally 
discounted. Relatedly, practical indeterminacy is crucial to the formulation of 
rights standards that are plausibly universal in application. For example, in for-
mulating a universal right to an adequate standard of living,41 we leave the stand-
ard of adequacy unspecified, precisely because it requires different types and 
quantities of resources in different places. Restating it in terms of specific stand-
ards undermines this universalizability.42 
Having said all this, it is still important that human rights claims have some ca-
pacity to be action-guiding and applicable to specific circumstances. The prom-
ulgation of purely abstract, purely aspirational ideals cannot, by itself, remedy the 
ills that human rights practice seeks to address, because it isn’t sufficient to guide 
the work of policy-makers and legal institutions that allocate resources, coordi-
nate people’s actions, and monitor compliance. If an account of human rights can-
not provide some guidance about which actions are required of which actors, it 
risks becoming normatively inert. This doesn’t mean that a greater degree of prac-
tical determinacy overrides all other desiderata in an account of human rights. 
But it does mean that practical indeterminacies are a matter of legitimate concern 
in the formulation of such an account.  
 
                                               
the postulation of a human right to x can provide us with impetus to seek out duty-bearers to assume the 
responsibilities that the right to x implies, e.g. by establishing institutions aimed at securing the provision 
of x; see Waldron, “Duty-bearers for positive rights”, October 15 2014, NYU School of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 14-58; available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510506. 
41 UDHR, Article 25. 
42 For a discussion of these uses of abstraction, see Adam Etinson, “Human rights, claimability, and the 





3.2 Scope indeterminacy 
As noted above, some authors have lamented the seemingly anarchic proliferation 
of human rights claims.43 The root of this complaint isn’t usually the proliferation 
as such, but its undisciplined nature. If new human rights are being proclaimed 
in the absence of a decisive arbiter of their validity, without well-defined criteria 
against which their validity can be judged, it will be too easy for implausible hu-
man rights claims to gain superficial currency. This debases the integrity of hu-
man rights discourse, and it may also undermine the perceived legitimacy of oth-
erwise credible human rights claims, via a kind of contaminative association. 
Criticisms in this vein are not merely about the failure to fully explicate all the 
practical ramifications of our rights claims. They are about an indeterminacy of 
scope: a failure to delineate the range of concerns to which the concept of ‘a human 
right’ can be appropriately applied.  
In general, an account of a concept, C, has greater ‘scope determinacy’ to the ex-
tent that it can issue verdicts about a greater range of putative instances of C, 
with respect to the basic classificatory question of whether each of these cases is 
a genuine instance of C. An account of human rights suffers from scope indetermi-
nacy, by this definition, to the extent that it fails to provide a clear and workable 
specification of what makes something a human right. To illustrate, suppose 
we’re trying to assess the legitimacy of 20 different putative human rights claims 
– including some that are nearly universally accepted, e.g. the right not to be tor-
tured, and some that are very controversial, e.g. the right to be loved. And suppose 
we are considering two alternative theories of human rights, A and B, which may 
be used as a point of reference in this assessment. Let’s say that theory A issues a 
determinate verdict on all 20 of the claims under consideration. It tells us that in 
ten of the cases, the putative human rights are legitimate, while in the other ten 
cases they aren’t. By contrast, suppose that theory B only issues a determinate 
verdict on some of the cases. Theory B agrees that ten of these putative human 
rights claims are bogus, but of the other ten putative claims, it is undecided about 
half of them. For five of those claims it issues a determinate verdict – that they are 
                                               
43 For example, Griffin says “we know perfectly well what makes an act ‘courageous’ or ‘considerate’”, 
whereas when it comes to the application of the term human right, “there are unusually few criteria for 
determining when the term is used correctly and when incorrectly”; On Human Rights at 16. Griffin’s point 
isn’t merely that people disagree about the legitimacy of specific human rights claims. We may find our-
selves looking at two rival accounts of human rights, offering different verdicts about the legitimacy of 
specific human rights claims, based on alternative sets of criteria for assessing what makes a human rights 
claim legitimate. That kind of disagreement about how to apply the concept of a human right would be 
perfectly fine and unremarkable. It is the kind of disagreement we have over the application of some of 
our most commonly-used concepts, like justice or wrongness. Griffin’s point, however, is that disagreements 
about the legitimacy of contested human rights claims generally isn’t like this. These disagreements owe 
largely to the fact that we often don’t posit clear criteria for assessing the legitimacy of human rights 
claims, and indeed, haven’t even properly settled the scope of the subject matter we are trying to advert 
to using the contested terminology. For an earlier discussion of similar concerns, see Philip Alston, “Con-
juring up new human rights: a proposal for quality control” (1984) 78:3 The American Journal of Interna-





legitimate human rights claims – but for the others it remains undecided, and 
doesn’t issue a verdict in either direction. By virtue of this discrepancy we can say 
that B has less ‘scope determinacy’, as an account of human rights, compared to 
A. 
This sort of scope indeterminacy is a problem given the influence of human rights 
in contemporary policy-making. It is bad enough being unable to specify the prac-
tical requirements generated by recognized human rights. It is even worse if there 
is deep and persistent uncertainty about what qualifies as a bona fide human rights 
claim in the first place. Philosophical theorizing about human rights cannot fix 
this by itself. However clear and well-argued it may be, a token theory of human 
rights cannot miraculously prevent the uptake of ill-conceived or spurious human 
rights claims. If there is going to be ‘quality control’ in the proclamation and 
recognition of novel human rights claims, relevant institutional authorities must 
be involved.44 But at the same time, unless we are prepared to accept human 
rights proclamations based on nothing more than institutional fiat, theory cannot 
but be involved. In trying to decide which rights should be formally recognized 
as human rights, we need some sort of principled criteria for identifying bona fide 
human rights, independently of their ratification. In principle, then, philosophi-
cal theories of human rights have work to do in addressing scope indeterminacy. 
They offer conceptual resources that can guide institutional vetting processes, by 
explaining how to conceive of the nature of human rights, how they are norma-
tively grounded, and how legitimate human rights claims can be identified.45 
In one sense ‘scope indeterminacy’ is a matter of theoretical concern, although it 
has practical implications as well. For one thing, as I say above, a haphazard, un-
accountable increase in novel human rights claims may affect the perceived cred-
ibility and hence the legitimacy of human rights discourse and institutions. For 
another thing, addressing practical indeterminacy in human rights partly involves 
making judgements about the relative priority of the duties associated with vari-
ous rights claims, and this is harder to carry out in the midst of uncertainty about 
exactly which rights claims figure in the schedule of human rights whose associ-
ated duties stand in need of specification.  
                                               
44 For arguments along these lines see Alston, “Conjuring up new human rights” at 618-21. 
45 For further discussion see Griffin, On Human Rights at 14; Allen Buchanan, “Human rights and the legit-
imacy of the international order” (2008) 14:1 Legal Theory 39; Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on legitimation 
through human rights” in M. Pensky, ed., The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (MIT Press, 2001) 113. 
Obviously there are some complications lurking beneath the surface here. A philosophical account of hu-
man rights that resolves issues of scope determinacy is no good unless it also achieves a reasonable level 
of ‘fit’ with commonly-held understandings about what human rights are. If an account of human rights 
fails in this regard, it will strike us as being a theory of something else – some philosophical construct that 
only nominally relates to ordinary discourse about human rights; see Adam Etinson, “On being faithful to 
the ‘practice’: a response to Nickel” in A. Etinson, ed., Human Rights: Moral or Political? (Oxford University 





3.3 Minimalism and practical determinacy 
How do these problems of indeterminacy, and the corrective ideal of determinacy, 
generate an argument for Minimalism? In answering this it is useful to have a 
shorthand way of referring to human rights theories that demand more than Min-
imalism. I will use the term Supraminimalist for this purpose. Whereas a Minimal-
ist says human rights merely aim to facilitate a minimally decent life, a Supramin-
imalist says that human rights aim to facilitate something better than this, e.g. a 
life that partakes of certain important human goods.46 
In reference to practical determinacy the most plausible way to argue for Mini-
malism is to appeal to simple logistics. A Minimalist human rights framework 
will have fewer practical indeterminacy problems to contend with overall, com-
pared to a Supraminimalist framework, because it recognizes fewer rights whose 
practical implications need to be specified. All else being equal, the less that hu-
man rights entitle their bearers to receive, the fewer resources they will demand, 
and the less logistically complex the task of providing these will be. Securing the 
conditions for a better-than-minimally-decent life will mean securing access to a 
wider range of goods, in health, education, employment, recreation, political par-
ticipation, etc. The more and better the resources people are entitled to in these 
areas, as a matter of right, the more logistically onerous the practical challenges 
of fulfilling those entitlements will become. On each frontier there will be a wider 
range of problems to be addressed, including what the duties associated with the 
specified rights are, who exactly bears those duties, the priority of those duties 
relative to other duties implied by other legitimate rights claims, and which ex-
tenuating conditions qualify those duties. 
With painstaking work, these questions can be answered, one by one, for each 
rights claim in its specific context of application. But this doesn’t negate the 
point. The practical implementation of a Minimalist human rights framework is 
still less logistically onerous than a Supraminimalist framework, due to con-
stantly evolving background conditions. As new technologies, crises, and socio-
economic conditions arise, fresh issues around the practical implications of es-
tablished human rights claims emerge with them. For example, with the growth 
of online communication technologies we are forced to reexamine the require-
                                               
46 To be clear, Supraminimalism thus defined is not a straw person. With respect to human rights practice 
and human rights law, it is a position that is reflected in the widespread acceptance of human rights 
claims that manifestly purport to facilitate something better than a minimally decent existence, including 
several of the examples mentioned in §1, e.g. the ICESCR’s professed human right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (Article 12.1). Supraminimalism is further recommended by philosophical theories of 
human rights that take the contemporary Supraminimalist human rights practice as a guiding template 
for a theoretical specification of the scope of human rights, in particular Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights. 
And Supraminimalism is defended on independent theoretical grounds in a number of philosophical the-
ories of human rights, including Greg Dinsmore, “When less really is less: what’s wrong with minimalist 
approaches to human rights” (2007) 15:4 The Journal of Political Philosophy 473, and Etinson, “Human 





ments of privacy in a digital context, e.g. whether the right to freedom of expres-
sion entails a corollary right to internet access, and how to secure this access if 
so. No matter how fully-fleshed-out our theory of human rights is, the indetermi-
nacies in practical implementation that are created by changing conditions can-
not be pre-emptively settled. This is true for Minimalism and Supraminimalism 
alike. New indeterminacies are always arising, irrespective of how minimal the 
scope of human rights is. But because Minimalism guarantees fewer goods than 
Supraminimalism, it makes the recurring problem of resolving these indetermi-
nacies less arduous. As an illustration, consider two specifications of the right to 
education, one Minimalist, one Supraminimalist. 
Article 42.3.2 of the Constitution of Ireland (1937): The State shall… as guard-
ian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions that the children 
receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual, and social. 
Article 13.1 of the ICESCR (1966): The States Parties… agree that education 
shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms. 
Both articles raise issues of practical determinacy. For instance, what types of 
moral and social education are encompassed in the Irish Constitution’s notion of 
minimum education? And what are the implications of this given changing socio-
economic and technological conditions, which affect equality of access, among 
other things? These problems have to be worked out in practice. Nonetheless, the 
point is that if the scope of the right to education is formulated in Supraminimal-
ist terms, as we see in the ICESCR – aiming at something like the “full develop-
ment of the human personality” – then the horizon of practical indeterminacy will 
expand. Our education system will have to supply a wider variety of goods – not 
just knowledge, but goods relating to all aspects of human life and development 
– and therefore many additional logistical judgment calls will have to be made 
about how these things are provided.47  
It doesn’t follow from this that any particular human rights institution, policy 
proposal, or treaty that adopts a Minimalist approach will have greater practical 
                                               
47 Human rights express underlying values that are themselves subject to ongoing investigation. For ex-
ample, if the right to privacy is underwritten by the value of dignity, then the requirements of the right 
depends on the nature of dignity. And the articulation of these connections is open-ended, because the 
nature of our underlying values is always open to philosophical debate, which leaves room for ‘judgment 
calls’ about the demands of the right – e.g. in the case of the right to privacy, whether it is compatible 
with various forms of ‘deep state’ surveillance. Although I have been emphasizing practical issues, we 
should also recognize that the practical indeterminacies facing a Supraminimalist approach aren’t just 
about the means that we use to pursue our ends, they are also about the content of the ends themselves: 
the nature of the values or goods that are secured by human rights, and the extent of people’s entitlement 
to them. For a discussion of how underlying values affect the practical specification of human rights 
claims, see Saladin Meckled-Garcia, “Specifying human rights” in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and 





determinacy compared to any specific institution or treaty that takes a Supramin-
imalist approach. It is possible to propose a Minimalistic schedule of human 
rights while failing to address questions about the practical implications of rights 
thus asserted. It is also possible to propose a Supraminimalistic schedule of hu-
man rights, while taking care to specify all the practical requirements of the rights 
that one asserts. The comparative assessments that I am advancing here are better 
understood at the level of types of human rights theories, rather than token in-
stances of those types. An argument for Minimalism from practical determinacy 
is, in essence, about the reduced logistical burdens and related difficulties that a 
broadly Minimalist approach to human rights has to contend with. It is less bur-
densome for Minimalists to aspire to practical determinacy, because there is less 
that they are purporting to determine. 
Note that the argument for Minimalism I am developing here, based on the desid-
eratum of practical determinacy, partly works in tandem with arguments for 
Minimalism based on ideals of feasibility and political viability, as discussed in 
§2.3. A human rights system that takes on a Supraminimalist approach becomes 
more economically costly to support, more politically fraught to implement 
(partly due to its costliness), and more complicated to manage (partly due to its 
being politically fraught). The challenge of spelling out the practical implications 
of a state’s human rights commitments is connected with all these downsides. It 
adds to them in that it requires the expenditure of additional economic and hu-
man resources, e.g. to operate human rights commissions and other advisory bod-
ies that oversee the translation of abstract human rights commitments into legis-
lation and policy. It overlaps with them, in that the political challenges of imple-
menting and sustaining human rights reforms will be greater the more costly and 
bureaucratically intrusive they end up being.48 Again, a Minimalist approach is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for having a practically determinate human rights 
system. But it tends to reduce the burdens of achieving a practically determinate 
human rights system, in a way that mirrors, and partly reinforces, other kinds of 
pressures that will already tend to make a Minimalist approach more feasible and 
politically viable. 
 
3.4 Minimalism and scope determinacy 
Setting aside practical determinacy, does Minimalism have further advantages 
over a Supraminimalist approach in trying to achieve scope determinacy? First, 
consider how the Supraminimalist might take a defensive stance. Suppose I am 
defending a Supraminimalist theory on which the demands of human rights in-
clude the provision of some goods beyond those that are necessary for a minimally 
decent life. If I am confronted with worries about scope indeterminacy, I might 
                                               





say something like: “look, the legitimate human rights claims are the ones that are 
explicated in my theory; so I have offered a complete specification of the scope of 
human rights”. Having determinacy of scope in this particularized sense counts 
for something, but it doesn’t dispel the worry. In order to bolster the credibility 
of human rights discourse, and practically prioritize the duties that are derived 
from human rights claims, we need something more like generally-accepted deter-
minacy of scope. Again, as discussed in §3.2, it is primarily the job of human rights 
institutions to achieve this. But to reiterate my earlier point, formal procedures 
for resolving scope-related controversies must be informed by a theory of what 
human rights are, or else they will be relying on institutional fiat. And this theory 
will have to underwrite generally-acceptable verdicts about new and contested 
human rights claims. The main disadvantage of a Supraminimalist approach to 
human rights, with respect to problems of scope determinacy, is that it less well-
placed to underwrite generally-acceptable verdicts about new and controversial 
human rights claims. 
Here is a simple thought experiment that indicates why this is the case. Imagine 
we have two Supraminimalists, who both conceive of human rights as the rights 
whose correlative duties call for the realisation of the conditions necessary for a 
somewhat-better-than-minimally-decent life – call this an okay life. And suppose 
we ask each of them to independently produce a complete list of bona fide human 
rights claims – no practical specification of duties, just the rights claims such as 
they are. Imagine we also have two Minimalists – who believe human rights 
merely aim to facilitate a minimally decent life – and we also ask them to produce 
a full list of human rights. We would expect a higher proportion of overlap and 
‘matching’ in the second pair of lists than in the first. There is some room for rea-
sonable disagreement about the requirements of a minimally decent life. But there 
is even more room for reasonable disagreement about the requirements of an okay 
life.49 Once we move beyond two hypothetical individuals, and consider the real-
life stakeholders in human rights institutions – representatives of different 
worldviews, divided by language, culture, geography, religion, and history – the 
disparities will increase. These parties may disagree about what’s needed to enjoy 
a minimally decent life, but they will have more disagreements about what’s 
needed to enjoy an okay life. The fewer disagreements our theoretical approach 
                                               
49 There are ways of cashing out this claim that would amount to an assertion of value pluralism, i.e. the 
view that there is “an irreducible plurality of values or principles that are relevant to moral judgment”; 
see Susan Wolf “Two levels of pluralism” (1992) 102:4 Ethics 785 at 785. To be clear, I am not meaning to 
commit myself to this view in the argument I’m making here. Consider the non-pluralist – the monist – 
who believes that there is a singular value that is relevant to moral judgement, which, if clearly appre-
hended, could settle all debates about the requirements of an okay life. Even the most resolute monist 
should recognize that in disagreements about questions of value in the actual world, where foundational 
ethical issues are a matter of perennial debate, we are nearly always unable to identify considerations that 
rationally compel the assent of all sincere and well-informed parties on these questions. When I say that 
there is room for reasonable disagreement about the requirements of an okay life, all I mean to be com-
mitting myself to are these kinds of relatively uncontroversial points, about the inescapability of real-





forces us to contend with, the more hope we have of establishing generally-ac-
ceptable verdicts about contested human rights claims. Minimalism limits the 
range of normative issues under consideration, and thereby creates the possibility 
of greater pluralistic convergence. 
To echo my point about practical logistics in §3.3, it is true that careful consulta-
tion and dialogue may sometimes foster a consensus where none was thought 
possible.50 But as in the logistics case, this task is never finished. Shifting social 
and technological conditions mean that there are constantly-evolving parameters 
around our attempts to understand and define human interests. Granted, this 
continual change has some destabilizing effect on judgements about the require-
ments of a minimally decent life. But it has a greater destabilizing effect on judge-
ments about the requirements for a life that exceeds this threshold. Trying to get 
adherents of different worldviews to agree about this, in an ever-evolving world, 
is a monumental challenge. Minimalism restricts our focus to a more limited 
range of basic human needs, around which cross-cultural judgements remain 
comparatively stable even in the midst of social changes.51  
To summarize: an individual Supraminimalist can propose determinate answers 
to questions about the scope of human rights. But Minimalism, as a general ap-
proach to theorizing human rights, is better-placed to offer generally-acceptable 
verdicts about contested human rights claims, and thus to prevent the problems 
that come with a proliferation of spurious human rights claims. This is because it 
confines the scope of human rights discourse to areas where followers of different 
worldviews are more likely to find agreement. 
Similar to the previous section, this argument for Minimalism works in tandem 
with an argument sketched in §2.3, based on pluralistic adequacy. In order to gain 
the support of a diverse public – and to avoid charges of imposing a parochial, 
Western ethical agenda – human rights must be acceptable to a wide range of 
                                               
50 To express cautious optimism in this direction isn’t to accept any strong thesis about the universality 
of human rights standards. As my discussion indicates, I think adherents of different worldviews have 
genuine disagreements about the normative issues that human rights standards seek to address. Where 
consensus is achievable, it is to be achieved not by effacing these differences, but by finding compromises 
and adaptable normative standards that are acceptable to all parties. As Sen puts it, parochiality and 
partisanship in human rights standards can be avoided “not so much by taking either a conjunction, or 
an intersection, of the views respectively held by dominant voices in different societies across the world… 
but through an interactive process… examining what would survive in public discussion, given a reason-
ably free flow of information and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points of view”; Amartya Sen, 
“Elements of a theory of human rights” (2004) 32:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315 at 320. 
51 There is a somewhat flat-footed reply available here. One might simply say: “it cannot be that hard to 
achieve agreement about these matters; after all, look at all these international human rights treaties that 
have been signed by most or all UN member states”. But this line of reasoning moves far too quickly. It is 
hard to tell what degree of common understanding about the nature of an okay human life is indicated by 
countries entering into human rights treaties. One complicating factor is that states often register formal 
reservations that limit their treaty obligations. Another complicating factor is that states often enter these 
treaties under various forms of external duress. (On both of points, see Chapter 2 of Posner The Twilight of 
Human Rights Law.) There too many complicating factors in the vicinity to suppose that the point I’m mak-





worldviews. Minimalism makes this easier, since there is more intercultural 
agreement on what makes for a minimally decent existence, than on what makes 
for a flourishing (or otherwise better-than-minimally-decent) life. A different 
way to try to achieve pluralistic adequacy, if you are committed to Supraminimal-
ism, is to downplay worries about indeterminacy of scope. As long as we have 
something close to a pluralistic consensus about a wide range of established hu-
man rights claims, so one might argue, we can live with uncertainties and dis-
putes about controversial new human rights claims. This is a defensible position, 
in principle. But the more we reckon with the actual costs that indeterminacy of 
scope brings with it, the more pressure this position comes under. By foreground-
ing those costs, we reinforce our explanation of why the turn to Minimalism 
seems like the right way of dealing with the demand for a pluralistically adequate 
account human rights. Given its more limited aspirations, Minimalism leaves a 
narrower window for disagreement, and thus offers the best hope for articulating 
human rights standards that are at once both pluralistically adequate and deter-
minate in scope. 
  
4. Conclusion 
Our question was why are many human rights theorists reluctant to embrace the 
Supraminimalist aims of contemporary human rights practice? Why do they hold 
onto the idea that human rights should merely be aiming to shield us from the 
worst? The arguments above don’t show that Supraminimalism is utterly unten-
able, but they offer a sharper sense of the challenges that come with it.52 If you 
want human rights standards to be feasible, politically viable, and pluralistically 
adequate, you are more likely to get what you want on a Minimalist view. The 
ideal of determinacy reinforces this. If you think the practical implications of hu-
man rights claims need to be explicated, this widens the ‘feasibility gap’ between 
Minimalism and Supraminimalism. And if you think we should be seeking a de-
terminate, general consensus about the scope of human rights, this will make it 
even harder for Supraminimalists to offer a pluralistically adequate account of 
human rights, compared to Minimalists. 
International human rights law and contemporary policies aiming to realize hu-
man rights are evidently Supraminimalist, and many human rights theorists think 
we must theorize human rights in a way that answers to this fact.53 And yet there 
                                               
52 There are arguments against Minimalism that I haven’t discussed, including the argument that Mini-
malism is in a certain sense self-defeating. The argument, roughly, is that if human rights standards are 
only activated in the most urgent circumstances – in attempts to remedy atrocities, severe injustices, and 
moments of total political chaos – then they will seldom be realizable or enforceable. As one author says, 
then, “the minimalist conception of rights stakes its claims in precisely the situations where they are most 
likely to fail, further undermining the human rights project”; see Dinsmore, “When less really is less” at 
473. 





continues to be a gravitational pull towards Minimalism in human rights theory. 
This pull exists because we expect human rights to be practically translated into 
effective law and policy, and because there are certain regulative ideals, including 
determinacy, which it seems like we must aspire to in order for this to have any 
decent chance of success. The more ambitious the agenda that we adopt under 
the banner of human rights, the harder it is to have human rights law and policy 
that is practically spelled-out, determinate in scope, acceptable to an ideologi-
cally diverse set of peoples, and politically realizable among those peoples.  
But just how timid should our ambitions be? We could contrast Minimalism with 
an approach that demands even less, on which human rights aim to facilitate not 
even a decent life, but merely a life that’s very slightly preferable to abject suffer-
ing. Let’s call this view Sub-Minimalism. It would seem bizarre to criticize Mini-
malism for being less feasible than Sub-Minimalism, or to praise Sub-Minimalism 
because it has an easier time offering a pluralistically adequate account of the con-
ditions required for the slightly-better-than-abject standard of life that it sees hu-
man rights as aiming to facilitate. The fact that it is more difficult to offer a human 
rights framework that is determinate, politically feasible, pluralistically ade-
quate, and which goes beyond modest, Minimalistic aims, doesn’t yet mean that 
the attempt is pointless. If the ease of the task were the only priority, then the 
solution would be to set our sights as low as possible. If the arguments for Sub-
Minimalism seem absurd, this is because the ease of the task isn’t the only thing 
that matters. Human rights are, in some sense, about trying to significantly im-
prove humanity’s lot.54 This overarching purpose needs to be factored in, some-
how or other, in any account of the character and limits of human rights. 
When we observe Minimalist theorizing in human rights discourse, including 
from authors who raise concerns about practical indeterminacy, like O’Neill and 
Posner, we don’t get a sense of people who are simply indifferent to this overarch-
ing purpose. What we see, rather, is a sincere and almost solemn pessimism. We 
see worries about how things go awry if we set our sights too high, which encour-
age erring on the side of caution in trying to improve humanity’s lot. However one 
feels about that sort of pessimism, the difficulties of developing a credible Supra-
minimalist account of human rights will have to be properly reckoned with. As I 
explained in §3.4, it is a major challenge trying to get representatives of different 
value systems to agree about the requirements for an okay or good life, and all the 
more so when social changes are complicating our understanding of human needs 
                                               
54 To quote Amartya Sen, echoing Marx, the appeal to human rights comes “mostly from those who are 
concerned with changing the world, rather than interpreting it”; see “Elements of a theory of human 





and interests. Even nebulous agreements about these matters are difficult to 
achieve, let alone determinate and precise agreements.55 
                                               
55 For comments and feedback on earlier versions of this article I am grateful to an anonymous referee and 
the editors of this journal, as well as audiences at the Durham University Law School in 2019, the Aus-
tralian Association of Philosophy Conference at Monash University in 2016, and the American Philosoph-
ical Association Pacific Division meeting in 2016. This paper started life as a co-authored piece of writing 
with Adam Etinson. Eventually he and I realised that our views were a bit too out of sync to make the co-
authoring feasible. But I am immensely grateful to Adam for the many fertile discussions we had about 
these issues, and for the work he contributed to earlier versions of this paper. Of course I take full respon-
sibility for the views in the paper and any problems with them. 
